The Venezuelan People Stay With the Bolivarian Revolution
On July 28, the 70th birthday of Hugo Chávez (1954-2013), Nicolás Maduro Moros won the Venezuelan presidential election, the fifth since the Bolivarian Constitution was ratified in 1999. In January 2025, Maduro will start his third six-year term as president. He took over the reins of the Bolivarian Revolution after the death of Chávez from pelvic cancer in 2013. Since the death of Chávez, Maduro has faced several challenges: to build his own legitimacy as president in the place of a charismatic man who came to define the Bolivarian Revolution; to tackle the collapse of oil prices in mid-2014, which negatively impacted Venezuela’s state revenues (over 90 percent of which was from oil exports); and to manage a response to the unilateral, illegal sanctions deepened on Venezuela by the United States as oil prices declined. These negative factors weighed heavily on the Maduro government, which has now been in office for a decade after being re-elected through the ballot box in 2018 and now in 2024.
From Maduro’s first election victory in 2013, the increasingly far-right opposition began to reject the electoral process and complain about irregularities in the system. Interviews I have held over the past decade with conservative politicians have made it clear that they recognize both the ideological grip of Chavismo over the working class of Venezuela and the organizational power not only of Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela but of the networks of Chavismo that run from the communes (1.4 million strong) to youth organizations. About half of Venezuela’s voting population is reliably wedded to the Bolivarian project, and no other political project in Venezuela has the kind of election machine built by the forces of the Bolivarian revolution. That makes winning an election for the anti-Chávez forces impossible. To that end, their only path is to malign Maduro’s government as corrupt and to complain that the elections are not fair. After Maduro’s victory—by a margin of 51.2 percent to 44.2 percent—this is precisely what the far-right opposition has been trying to do, egged on by the United States and a network of far-right and pro-U.S. governments in South America.
Europe Needs Venezuelan Oil
The United States has been trying to find a solution to a problem of its own making. Having placed severe sanctions against both Iran and Russia, the United States now cannot easily find a source of energy for its European partners. Liquified natural gas from the United States is expensive and not sufficient. What the U.S. would like is to have a reliable source of oil that is easy to process and in sufficient quantities. Venezuelan oil fits the requirements, but given the U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, this oil cannot be found in the European market. The United States has created a trap from which it finds few solutions.
In June 2022, the U.S. government allowed Eni SpA (Italy) and Repsol SA (Spain) to transport Venezuelan oil to the European market to compensate for the loss of Russian oil deliveries. This allowance revealed Washington’s shift in strategy regarding Venezuela. No longer was it going to be possible to suffocate Venezuela by preventing exports of oil, since this oil was needed as a result of U.S. sanctions on Russia. Since June 2022, the United States has been trying to calibrate its need for this oil, its antipathy to the Bolivarian Revolution, and its relations with the far-right opposition in Venezuela.
The U.S. and the Venezuelan Far-Right
The emergence of Chavismo—the politics of mass action to build socialism in Venezuela—transformed the political scenario in the country. The old parties of the right (Acción Democrática and COPEI) collapsed after 40 years of alternating power. In the 2000 and 2006 elections, the opposition to Chávez was provided not by the right, but by dissenting center-left forces (La Causa R and Un Nuevo Tiempo). The Old Right faced a challenge from the New Right, which was decidedly pro-capitalist, anti-Chavista, and pro-U.S.; this group formed a political platform called La Salida or The Exit, which referred to their desired exit from the Bolivarian Revolution. The key figures here were Leopoldo López, Antonio Ledezma, and María Corina Machado, who led violent protests against the government in 2014 (López was arrested for incitement to violence and now lives in Spain; a U.S. government official in 2009 said he is “often described as arrogant, vindictive, and power-hungry”). Ledezma moved to Spain in 2017 and was—with Corina Machado—a signatory of the far-rightMadrid Charter, an anti-communist manifesto organized by the Spanish far-right party, Vox. Corina Machado’s political project is underpinned by the proposal to privatize Venezuela’s oil company.
Since the death of Chávez, Venezuela’s right wing has struggled with the absence of a unified program and with a mess of egotistical leaders. It fell to the United States to try and shape the opposition into a political project. The most comical attempt was the elevation in January 2019 of an obscure politician named Juan Guaidó to be the president. That maneuver failed and in December 2022, the far-right opposition removed Guaidó as its leader. The removal of Guaidó allowed for direct negotiations between the Venezuelan government and the far-right opposition, which had since 2019 hoped for U.S. military intervention to secure them in power in Caracas.
The U.S. pressured the increasingly intransigent far-right to hold talks with the Venezuelan government in order to allow the U.S. to reduce sanctions and let Venezuelan oil go into European markets. This pressure resulted in the Barbados Agreement of October 2023, in which the two sides agreed to a fair election in 2024 as the basis for the slow withdrawal of the sanctions. The elections of July 28 are the outcome of the Barbados process. Even though María Corina Machado was barred from running, she effectively ran against Maduro through her proxy candidate Edmundo González and lost in a hard-fought election.
Twenty-three minutes after the polls closed, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris—and now a presidential candidate in the November elections in the United States—put out a tweet conceding that the far-right had lost. It was an early sign that the United States—despite making noises about election fraud—wanted to move past their allies in the far-right, find a way to normalize relations with the Venezuelan government and allow the oil to flow to Europe. This tendency of the U.S. government has frustrated the far-right, which turned to other far-right forces across Latin America for support, and which knows that its remaining political argument is about election fraud. If the U.S. government wants to get Venezuelan oil to Europe it will need to abandon the far-right and accommodate the Maduro government. Meanwhile, the far-right has taken to the streets through armed gangs who want to repeat the guarimba (barricade) disruptions of 2017.
This article was produced by Globetrotter.
US-Backed Canadian Mine in Guatemala Threatens Water Supply for Millions
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MICHAEL FOX | TRUTHOUT
What Major Media Outlets Aren't Saying About Bob Menendez
Gold bars. Stacks of cash. A Mercedes-Benz convertible.
Bob Menendez, the Cuban-American senator who is facing bribery charges in federal court today, has become a caricature of corruption in U.S. politics.
But what major media outlets aren't reporting is Menendez’s historic ties to U.S.-based terrorists responsible for bombings and assassinations in New York City and New Jersey. Nor is there much news about Menendez's outsized role in imposing devastating sanctions on Cuba that have fueled unprecedented migration to the U.S. border.
In our JUST RELEASED documentary, Hardliner on the Hudson, award-winning Cuban journalist Liz Oliva Fernández takes a deep dive into these issues and more. Check it out now for free on YouTube.
Here’s a social media toolkit for Hardliner on the Hudson for you to easily share the film on your preferred social media platforms.
Also, don’t forgot to RSVP to a virtual premiere event on May 20 at 7pm ET for our groundbreaking documentary Uphill on the Hill, which explores why Biden has embraced Trump’s Cold War-era policy toward Cuba.
HERE is a social media toolkit for Uphill on the Hill.
Please help us spread the word about these important documentaries!
Haiti Project Joins the “Dialogue Inter-femmes” on February 29, 2024.
Continued solidarity of Haiti project’s women-candidates campaign with sister organizations
Thanks for your interest. Our website is https://haitipolicy.org
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Haiti crises have reached ‘a critical point’: UN envoy
More than 8,400 people were victims of gang violence in Haiti last year, including killings, injuries and kidnappings – a 122 per cent increase over 2022, the UN Special Representative for the country told the UN Security Council on Thursday.
“I cannot overstress the severity of the situation in Haiti, where multiple protracted crises have reached a critical point,” said Maria Isabel Salvador, presenting the latest report of the UN political office there, BINUH.
The Caribbean country remains plagued by mounting violence and insecurity at the hands of armed gangs against a backdrop of political, humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges.
Violence spreading
About 83 per cent of the unprecedented surge in killings and injuries occurred in the capital, Port-au-Prince, but violence has spread elsewhere, specifically Artibonite, the largest of Haiti's 10 departments
South of the capital, gangs conducted large-scale attacks to control key zones and continue to systematically use sexual violence in areas under their control, putting women and girls as young as 12 at risk.
Ms. Salvador said that since her last briefing in October, at least 75 people were reported killed by civilian vigilante movements that have emerged as collective defence against the gangs.
Support Haiti’s police
Meanwhile, BINUH has continued efforts to enhance the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP), but high attrition rates have further diminished the force’s ability to counter gang violence and maintain security.
The Haitian Government and the international community have stepped up support to the HNP over the past few months, she added.
This has included a 13 per cent increase allocated under the national budget for this fiscal year and the supply of individual protection equipment, armoured vehicles, motorcycles and weapons.
Last October, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a multinational security support mission (MSS) to back Haiti’s beleaguered police force, which Kenya offered to lead. A 2022 sanctions regime targeting gang leaders and their financiers was also renewed later that month.
Ms. Salvador said she will continue to encourage all stakeholders to effectively prepare for the mission's deployment and again appealed for countries to contribute generously towards this end.
Break the cycle
While improving the security situation is essential to break the cycle of overlapping crises besetting Haiti, she stressed that long-term stability can only be achieved through a nationally owned and inclusive political process.
Echoing the UN Secretary-General, she urged all political actors and stakeholders “in and for Haiti” to unite in prioritizing and upholding the interest of the people above all. She noted that “new violent actors have been gaining prominence” in recent months, sparking concerns over their potentially destabilizing role.
“The continuous support to the Haitian National Police, the rapid deployment of the MSS, effective sanctions and a sustained political process" which results in “credible, participatory and inclusive elections” are essential, she said.
These are “fundamental elements to restore security and stability in Haiti, where, consequently, the rule of law, democratic institutions and sustainable development become a reality for its people,” she added.
The head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Ghada Waly, also updated the Council on arms trafficking and illicit financial flows in Haiti.
A UNODC report last October had identified four major sea and land routes being used for illicit firearm and ammunition flows, mainly from the US.
The latest report, published on Wednesday, found that there are 11 recorded informal or clandestine airstrips spread out across Haiti.
“They represent a blind spot that is possibly being used by traffickers and smugglers, bearing in mind that smaller aircraft flying directly between the United States and Haiti are difficult to monitor,” Ms. Wady said.
A regional concern
Regional dynamics are also important as the deepening crisis in Haiti is not occurring in a vacuum, she added, noting that illicit firearms are a growing concern across the Caribbean, “feeding gang-related activity and drug trafficking in a vicious circle”.
The report also documents action to combat corruption and illicit financial flows, “which are major factors enabling violence and organized crime and plaguing Haiti’s own justice institutions”.
“Nevertheless, anti-corruption efforts continue to be impeded by insufficient capacity, lack of forensic equipment and limited expertise in conducting complex investigations,” she said.
The next UNODC report will focus on a detailed analysis of gang dynamics in Haiti.
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