2 year old Venezuelan separated from her parents by Trump administration
U.S. immigration policies are leaving fractured families, psychological trauma, and lost futures of those affected. Parents torn from their children, individuals detained under harsh conditions, and asylum seekers denied protection.
Recently, in a case that has sparked outrage across Venezuela, 2-year-old Maikelys Antonella Espinoza Bernal was separated from her mother and placed in U.S. custody, an act the Venezuelan government has denounced as a kidnapping. She is in a precarious limbo, detained in U.S. government care in El Paso, but without a removal order or immigration status and no clear future. Her fate lies in the hands of the Trump administration.
The mother, Yorely Bernal, arrived in Venezuela earlier this week in a deportation flight without the little girl, despite signing off on her 2-year-old’s deportation with her. U.S. officials did not reunite her with her toddler before she was forced her onto an airplane to her home country. Bernal’s husband, Maiker Espinoza, had been sent to El Salvador’s megaprison on March, disappearing from the family’s life for how long who knows.
The current US immigration policy resembles Nazi-era practices. Under Nazi rule, Jewish and other persecuted families were torn apart in concentration camps, often permanently. Today, Maikelys’ case is one among the thousands of children who are being separated from their parents by immigration enforcement without clear processes for reunification.
Yorely Bernal and Maiker Espinoza do not have a criminal record in Venezuela and spent the entirety of their time in the United States in ICE detention centers. They have not been charged with any crime, nor has the government initiated any formal proceedings to terminate the parents’ rights.
However, “the U.S. government has her in this weird purgatory where they know she’s here, but they’re not moving to do anything to execute her repatriation,” said Imelda Maynard, legal director for Estrella del Paso, which provides legal aid to migrant children.
Immigration lawyers and experts warn that the family’s distress shows the consequences of undermining due process in President Donald Trump’s push to deport 1 million people within his first year in office. His administration has accelerated deportations through executive orders and intensified allegations of gang affiliations against immigrants, frequently relying on minimal evidence or lacking formal charges. In some instances, experts argue, authorities have prioritized deportations over keeping families together and safeguarding parental rights.
“We are not delinquents. We have shown this and we will keep showing this, because we are not anything they are accusing us to be. I just ask the U.S. government that they give me back my child,” Bernal said. “It’s the only thing I ask as a mother.”
Maikelys’ family is not alone in their struggle. The demand for the girl’s safe return gained momentum in recent days. On April 28, the Venezuelan government issued an official statement condemning the actions of U.S. authorities, accusing them of violating human rights and international norms. According to the statement, Maikelys’ case is added to the long list of abuses committed against Venezuelan migrants. “The U.S. is once again committing the very serious act of separating families and removing minors from their emotional environment and especially from their biological parents,” the Venezuelan government declared.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) denied allegations of kidnapping, stating that Maikelys was removed from the deportation flight for her “safety and welfare.” She remains in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and has been placed with a foster family. DHS further claimed that her parents were linked to the Tren de Aragua gang, an accusation they have denied.
The case has ignited widespread protests and demands for justice, with Venezuelans rallying for the child’s return. The May Day parade in Venezuela became a platform for amplifying the call, with President Maduro addressing the issue as part of a broader struggle against U.S. policies affecting Venezuelan migrants. As Venezuela continues to push for Maikelys’ return, the case remains a stark reminder of the human cost of U.S. immigration policies.
The Limits of International Law: Why Haiti Paid France for Its Own Freedom
By Andres Mora Student of International Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee Published by Peace Action Wisconsin – April 2025
Yesterday, April 17, in commemoration of a little-known but deeply unjust historical event, we remembered the year 1825 when France forced Haiti to pay reparations… for becoming free.
After leading the only successful slave revolt in the Americas, Haiti declared independence and became the first Black republic in the world. It was a powerful moment in history, but instead of being celebrated, Haiti was punished.
Haiti won independence — but France sent warships and a bill
Just over 20 years after losing its richest colony, France returned to Haiti with a fleet of armed ships. Their message was clear: Pay us 150 million francs, or we’ll invade.
This money wasn’t meant to support Haiti’s recovery. It was to compensate former French slaveowners for the land and enslaved people they had lost.
With no allies and no real choice, Haiti agreed. It borrowed from French banks, taking on crushing debt. The country didn’t finish paying until 1947, more than a century later.
That debt drained Haiti’s economy and robbed generations of the chance to invest in health, education, and stability.
Could this be legal under international law?
Looking at it today, the answer is no.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, any agreement signed under the threat or use of force is not valid. This reflects a deeper principle known as jus cogens, rules so fundamental, like the ban on slavery or coercion, that no state can break them.
Even in the 1800s, these ideas were understood as part of customary international law. So even if France and Haiti signed a document, it wasn’t a true agreement, it was signed under military threat.
But it happened a long time ago…
True. But in law, serious violations don’t expire, especially those involving slavery, colonization, or coercion.
And the consequences didn’t end in the 19th century. The damage stretched across generations, and Haiti still lives with its effects today.
Can France say, That wasn’t us?
It can try, but international law doesn’t work that way.
Even though the debt was imposed by a king, today’s France is the legal continuation of the same state. When a government changes, the country remains legally responsible. France inherited the payments and with them, the responsibility.
Why hasn’t Haiti taken France to court?
Because international law isn’t always accessible to the most vulnerable.
To bring a case before the International Court of Justice, both countries have to agree to participate. And France, like many powerful nations can simply decline.
The law exists. But unfortunately, power can decide when it’s applied.
There’s still a way forward
Haiti still has options. It can raise its claim at the United Nations General Assembly, where every country, regardless of size or power, has a voice.
It can work with regional allies like CARICOM or the African Union to demand formal recognition, an apology, or even reparations.
And people around the world can support that effort by learning, remembering, and sharing this story, not out of anger, but out of a belief in fairness, peace, and dignity.
Sources
The New York Times. (2022). The Ransom: The Root of Haiti’s Misery. nytimes.com
The Guardian. (2022). France’s debt to Haiti: The double burden of freedom. theguardian.com
Diario Libre. (2024). Haití exige a Francia reparaciones por deuda por independencia. diariolibre.com
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Article 52. UN Legal Text
From Gaza to Cuba
As the U.S. continues to fund Israel's genocide in Gaza, Cuba, branded a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the U.S., trains hundreds of Palestinian doctors for free.
From Gaza to Cubatells the story of Murid Abukhater, a Palestinian medical student from Gaza studying at Cuba’s Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM). While his family and friends face the daily onslaught of Israel’s bombing, Murid struggles to focus on his studies. Learn more about Murid and his mission to return home and help save lives.
As abruptly as Trump Administration officials had begun deporting migrants from the U.S, to the Naval Station Guantánamo Bay (NSGB), it changed course andtransported all 178 individuals who had been brought to the Guantánamo;177 were repatriated to Venezuela via a handoff in Honduras; one was returned to an immigration facility in the States.
A court filing by an ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) official states, Guantánamo “will temporarily house aliens before they are removed to their home country or a safe third country. The use of NSGB is deemed necessary to complete ongoing removal operations due to the number of illegal aliens present in the United States.” Those “ongoing removal operations” can only entail further terrorizing of immigrant communities and violations of migrants’ rights. As justice and human rights activists contemplate an uncertain future, here is a look back at how the U.S. has arrived at this juncture.
On January 29, Trump issued anExecutive Orderdirecting the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security “to take all appropriate actions to expand the Migrant Operations Center at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay to full capacity to provide additional detention space for high-priority criminal aliens unlawfully present in the United States.” Trump has maintained that “full capacity” is 30,000 migrants.
Within days, there were ten alleged“high-threat”members of Tren de Aragua at Guantánamo, but they were NOT under the supervision of the Migrant Operations Center. Instead, they were being held in Camp 6, one of the military detention facilities used to house detainees brought to Guantanamo as part of the “Global War on Terrorism.”
The Guantánamo Bay Naval Base houses two separate facilities:
2. The Military Detention Center – established in 2002, to detain terrorism suspects under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).
The government has nolegal authorityto detain migrants in Camp 6 or any other military detention facility. Moreover, federal law ensures due process and immigration protections for all migrants transferred from the United States to Guantánamo. These legal guarantees have generated several lawsuits as immigrant rights and human rights groups push back on the Trump Administrations actions.
One lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act,aims to obtain more details concerning who has been deported to Guantánamo and their current conditions. Jointly filed by the Haitian Bridge Alliance (HBA), Detention Watch Network, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, the suit seeks to obtain all records and communications related to the administration’s criteria for determining who will be sent to Guantánamo, their immigration status and nationalities, the legal rights and processes they will be afforded, how long they will be held at the facility, the provision of food, health care, shelter, and other necessities, and where they will be taken next.
A second lawsuit,filed by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), and the ACLU of the District of Columbia, seeks access to lawyers for all of the migrants who have been moved to any location at Guantánamo. “[A]t a minimum,” the lawsuit argues, “attorneys must be allowed to communicate with the migrants via phone calls, video conferences or email.” Deepa Alagesan, a senior supervising attorney at IRAP, said in a statement. “We will not stand by as the United States government tries to use Guantánamo as a legal black box to deny immigrants their basic rights to counsel and due process.”
While the government is denying these migrants at Guantánamo access to lawyers, the Department of Homeland Securityreleased photos of men being taken off transport planes in shackles, along with a statement from Secretary Kristi Noem, “President Donald Trump has been very clear: Guantanamo Bay will hold the worst of the worst. That starts today.”
For all the above reasons, Guantánamo is recognized as thePlace Where Presidents Abuse Human Rights,a place with a sordid history of human rights abuses designed to keep people while evading oversight. Exactly what Trump may do next is uncertain, but immigrant rights and human rights activists must remain vigilant.September 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows,a founding organization of UFPJ, whose members have sought justice and accountability for the crimes of 9/11 for more than 24 years without judicial finality,condemned the deportation of migrants to Guantánamo,which can only further erode the rule of law the U.S. has experienced since 9/11.
During her tenure as Commander of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) from October 2021 to her retirement in November 2024, General Laura J. Richardson oversaw a significant expansion of U.S. military presence and strategic alliances in Latin America and the Caribbean. This initiative reflects Washington’s continued influence in the region, reinforcing a modern interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine aimed at maintaining U.S. dominance over hemispheric affairs, particularly concerning natural resources, trade routes, and geopolitical stability within the U.S. Rules-Based Order paradigm.
Expansion of U.S. Military Presence
Throughout the Biden Administration, under General Richardson’s leadership, the U.S. expanded its military footprint by bolstering existing bases and establishing new facilities. SOUTHCOM focused on key locations in Central America, the American Pacific Coast and the Caribbean, securing control over critical infrastructure and natural resources as well as countering foreign influence, specifically Washington's perceived threat from China.
Colombia: With seven U.S. military bases (two naval, three air force, two army), Colombia remains one of the closest U.S. military partners in the region. Under Richardson, joint operations, training exercises, and infrastructure investments increased, ensuring U.S. influence over the country’s energy and mineral resources.
Ecuador: In 2023, the U.S. secured a security cooperation agreement with Ecuador, deploying military personnel and resources to combat narcotics trafficking and organized crime within Ecuador. Discussions ensued about developing a new security cooperation site, reinforcing U.S. oversight of regional security and economic interests. Additionally, the U.S. gained access to the Galápagos Islands for military operations, expanding maritime control in the Pacific.
Guyana: Amid Washington-provoked tensions with Venezuela, the U.S. bolstered military collaboration with Guyana. In late 2023, SOUTHCOM conducted joint operations with the Guyana Defense Force, including air and maritime security exercises, reinforcing ties with this key oil-producing nation.
Peru: In May 2023, amid social unrest following the parliamentary coup against Pedro Castillo, Peru’s Congress approved the deployment of U.S. troops to train the Peruvian military and National Police. The measure continued a tradition of U.S. military training in the region—a practice dating back to the 1990s Fujimori dictatorship when U.S. SOUTHCOM maintained multiple bases in the country.
Deepening Alliances and Military Partnerships
Beyond physical expansion, SOUTHCOM intensified diplomatic and military engagement through security agreements, joint training programs, and capacity-building initiatives, solidifying U.S. hegemony while ensuring continued access to strategic resources and trade routes.
National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP): In fiscal year 2024, SOUTHCOM and the National Guard engaged in over 300 joint military activities with partner nations, strengthening defense cooperation and crisis response capabilities.
Panama: Recognizing Panama’s strategic importance, in 2022 General Richardson reaffirmed commitments to securing the Panama Canal, enhancing joint security measures to ensure control over this critical global trade corridor.
Caribbean Operations: SOUTHCOM reinforced partnerships in the Caribbean through military training, counter-drug operations, and humanitarian assistance. In Haiti, the U.S. ramped up contingency operations, deployed Marines to secure the U.S. Embassy, and supplied armored vehicles to Kenyan police leading a UN-mandated security mission. Additionally, the U.S. prepared its naval station at Guantanamo Bay to process a potential influx of Haitian migrants.
Geopolitical Considerations and Strategic Objectives
SOUTHCOM’s expansion aligns with broader strategic goals, reinforcing Monroe Doctrine principles in the 21st century. General Richardson highlighted the region’s resource wealth, stating in January 2023, “With all its rich resources and rare earth elements, there is the lithium triangle… Sixty percent of the world’s lithium is found in the lithium triangle: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile.” (LeftVoice.org)
This statement underscores the critical role that natural resource control plays in U.S. strategy. By securing access to these essential resources, the United States not only ensures its technological and economic advantage, but also reinforces its capacity to counter foreign influence in the Western Hemisphere.
As it rebuffs its neighbors' sovereign trade and military alliances, the U.S. seeks to curb China’s growing economic and security ties in the region by reinforcing U.S. partnerships and securing critical infrastructure, particularly in resource-rich nations. The strengthening of military alliances supports U.S.-defined regional stability, deterring what Washington labels "authoritarian influences" while securing access to vital resources such as oil, lithium, and rare earth minerals which are crucial for maintaining economic and technological competitiveness in the global high-tech industry. However, the expansion of U.S. military influence under General Richardson has raised concerns about national sovereignty and resource control in Latin America and the Caribbean. Increased U.S. involvement in domestic security policies limits local governments' ability to manage their defense and economic interests independently. Resource-rich nations often find themselves under indirect U.S. oversight, with Washington often leveraging regime change efforts to maintain long-term access to valuable commodities.
Continuity Under the New Trump Administration
As the Trump Administration approaches its first 30 days, it inherits extensive military infrastructure and regional alliances expanded under the Biden Administration and U.S. Southern Command. This creates a policy continuum in U.S.-Latin America relations, perhaps dictating Donald Trump’s strategic objectives.
The selection of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense suggests an acceleration within the continuum. Rubio's focus on countering China and its Western Hemisphere allies may lead to increased diplomatic and economic initiatives and/or threats in the region. Meanwhile, Hegseth's emphasis on reducing European security commitments could shift U.S. military resources toward the Western Hemisphere. These developments suggest a potential strategic shift related to the Obama Administration’s Asia/Pacific Pivot, further emphasizing U.S. military infrastructure and alliances in Latin America and the Caribbean.
It is important to view U.S./Latin American policy as a timeline of events spanning multiple administrations. Under the Biden Administration and General Richardson, SOUTHCOM significantly expanded U.S. military bases and alliances in Latin America and the Caribbean. This expansion underscores Washington’s long-term strategic objectives of countering foreign influence, securing trade routes, and maintaining military dominance in the Western Hemisphere. With the Trump Administration now inheriting this military expansion, the trajectory of U.S. engagement in the region is poised to continue, raising critical questions about national sovereignty, resource control, and long-term regional stability.
Author: Teri Mattson,Introduced to Mesoamerican Anthropology and Archaeology in the sixth grade, Teri's lifelong passion for Latin America & the Caribbean has inspired 40+ years of travel and activism throughout the region. The past few years include organizing and/or participating in electoral, political and social justice delegations to: Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela.
Teri currently works with the Mexico Solidarity Project’s media team and is affiliated with the Venezuela Solidarity Network. She is an activist with the SanctionsKill coalition, and a volunteer with CODEPINK’s Latin America team. Additionally, she hosts and produces the YouTube program and podcast WTF is Going on in Latin America & the Caribbean which is currently on hiatus.
"The Mass Deportation Handoff, Biden To Trump" by Todd Miller
According to Todd Miller in his article The Mass Deportation Handoff, Biden To Trump (February 5, 2025), the Biden administration did not break from the mass deportation policies of the Trump era; instead, it helped build the infrastructure that facilitated them. During Biden's four years in office, over $32.3 billion in contracts related to border security were awarded, making him the largest contractor in U.S. history in this regard. Among the most notable contracts were those with companies like GEO Group, which not only maintained the immigrant detention system but also handled the installation of monitoring devices for individuals under house arrest.
Miller emphasizes that although a narrative has been created about a divide between Biden's and Trump's immigration policies, the reality is that both administrations shared a similar approach to expanding the system of control and deportation. During Biden's tenure, border surveillance and detention infrastructure continued to grow, with the involvement of private companies and an ever-increasing budget for border security. In fact, Biden's administration surpassed Trump's in terms of contracts and budget, making Biden the primary driver of this border-industrial complex.
The author also notes that both Biden and Trump received campaign contributions from the border security industry, suggesting that, despite political differences, both parties have supported the expansion of this system. According to Miller, U.S. immigration policy has been part of a bipartisan consensus that has contributed to the growth of a "border-industrial complex," backed by private contractors and an increasingly invasive surveillance infrastructure.
Erasing "Mexico" from our maps isn't an aberration. It's part of a long pattern of anti-Mexican racism in the U.S., ranging from political scapegoating and border militarization to violent rhetoric that fuels hate crimes. But this move goes beyond that. It fits into a much larger U.S. strategy of controlling the Western Hemisphere, which dates back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which claimed the U.S. had the right to dictate who influences Latin America. Over time, this ideology has come to justify US-backed military interventions, coups, and economic manipulations in the region aimed at securing U.S. interests and ensuring that Latin America remains in a subordinate position.
Not only is the Gulf of Mexico a site of historical importance, but it is also rich in oil and natural resources. This fact is no coincidence. The United States has a long history of trying to control these resources including backing oil company boycotts against Mexico’s nationalized industry in the 1930s and signing trade agreements that favor U.S. companies over Mexican sovereignty. Renaming the Gulf of Mexico signals a territorial and economic claim over these waters and their resources further cementing U.S. imperial ambitions in the region.
Companies like Google Maps, which has announced plans to rename the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America after Trump's executive order, are just playing into the billionaire-fueled power grab that advances a racist, nationalist agenda of domination and imperialism. Even if Google only applies this change in the U.S., it still normalizes the idea that facts can be rewritten to serve a political agenda. At a time when diplomacy and mutual respect should be prioritized, honoring the internationally recognized name would send a clear message that Google values historical accuracy, global cooperation, and good neighborly relations.
The Gulf of Mexico is more than just a body of water; it is a shared resource of immense ecological, economic, and cultural significance for Mexico, the United States, and the world. It plays a critical role in regional trade, fisheries, and energy production, hosting some of North America's most important offshore oil reserves. The United States has long considered Latin America its "backyard," and this is another proof that its imperial ambitions are still alive.
The environmental devastation already occurring in the Gulf region is evidenced by devastating oil spills and the degradation of marine ecosystems. This destruction is further compounded as U.S. and foreign companies continue to exploit the region's resources with no regard for the long-term damage.
The movement to rename the Gulf of Mexico fits into a broader pattern of anti-Mexican sentiment in the United States that has often manifested in political scapegoating, hateful rhetoric, and border militarization. Such rhetoric fuels violence and hate crimes against Mexican and Latino communities. While Trump's attempt to erase "Mexico" from the Gulf of Mexico may appear symbolic, it could have devastating consequences. It reflects a disregard for historical truth, an aggressive assertion of U.S. superiority, and the continuation of exploitative colonialist practices that harm both the environment and Latin American people.
The United Nations Association of Greater Milwaukee Again Calls for the President to Honor World Consensus in the UN to End the Cuban Embargo
The United Nations Association of Greater Milwaukee on September 9, 2024, reiterated its request for President Biden to comply with the nearly unanimous calls from the United Nations General Assembly to end the US economic and trade sanctions against Cuba.
On October 29-30, 2024, the United Nations General Assembly will again debate and vote on “the necessity of ending” the US extraterritorial measures concerning Cuba, which block normal trade with Cuba by companies throughout the world. The resolution has been adopted annually for 32 years with almost unanimous consent, including 187 nations last year and all US NATO allies. (See attached.)
Related to this discussion at the UN about US sanctions against Cuba, the Milwaukee UNA chapter again requested that Biden remove Cuba from the US list of state supporters of terrorism. The SSOT designation blocks citizens from over 40 nations, including most US allies, from their normal ability to visit the US — based only on whether they have visited Cuba in recent years.
“We should stop resisting the world consensus and move towards normalized relations with Cuba” said Steve Watrous, president of the UNA of Greater Milwaukee. “While we were hoping President Biden would promptly restore the policy of the Obama-Biden administration, we urge him now to act while he is still in office to take Cuba off the SSOT list. It has no reasonable factual basis.”
The UN General Assembly is expected to overwhelmingly adopt the Cuba resolution. Only the US and Israel have opposed it since the end of the Obama administration, which abstained in 2016.
The UNA asks its members and contacts to contact the White House in support of these requests, such as via ACERE.org.
The U.S. has crafted a narrative of a stolen election in Venezuela, supported by the Carter Center as a source. The National Lawyers Guild refutes this false claim.
The National Lawyers Guild disputes repeated Carter Center press statements regarding the July 28 presidential elections in Venezuela. The Center issued a public statement less than 24 hours after the closing of the polls calling on the Venezuelan government to immediately publish the election results for each polling station across the country. As lawyers and scholars, we know that efforts like election monitoring must be done with care and caution, both of which the Carter Center has failed to exhibit.
It appears that Carter Center leadership has shifted to the right over the last several years, impacting its overall work in the US and around the world. The Center’s Chief Executive Officer, Paige Alexander, worked for USAID for over 15 years, now called “the new CIA.” She also sits on the southeast chapter board of the widely discredited Anti-Defamation League, which as recently as 2017 advised local police to plant undercover agents in anti-racist organizations in the US. A recent Center for Constitutional Rights report demonstrated how they use counterterrorism laws to target Palestinian solidarity organizers in the U.S., undermining free speech and civil rights. Jennie K. Lincoln, the Center’s senior advisor on Latin America and the Caribbean, is a former consultant with the Organization of American States, from which Venezuela withdrew in 2017 after repeated OAS attempts to undermine Venezuelan democracy and foment instability. Although we recognize that the Carter Center’s Democracy Program is praised for its election monitoring across the world, we are concerned that their funding sources, which include the US State Department, USAID, EU and UK government, make them vulnerable to imperialist political pressure. This may explain the hastiness of the Center in issuing its various statements and paralleling the US news cycle.
The Carter Center’s multiple press statements commit serious omissions and misrepresentations that undermine their credibility. We are most concerned by the Center’s claim that “voting took place in a generally civil manner” and that “Venezuelan citizens turned out peacefully.” Although our observations at voting stations early in the day certainly reflect that assessment, by the late afternoon, violent mobs targeted polling stations across the country to prevent the counting of the voting receipts and the distribution of the tallies. The Carter Center statement also failed to note the targeted attacks on election observers. NLG observers witnessed violent mobs with motorbikes and batons circling the hotel at which international observers were housed. At one point, our observers had to quickly run off the street to avoid what we fear may have become a violent encounter. Additionally, the Venezuelan electoral commission has reported a cyber attack that disrupted the transmission of results. The bot attack slowed down connections between the voting machines and the totalization center, and ultimately delayed the totalization process, an attack that should have raised red flags for the Carter Center. Recently, the Carter Center claimed the cyber attack was a hoax without offering any evidence, contrary to the conclusion reached by a technology professor from the Simon Bolivar University in Caracas. And perhaps worst of all, the Center has failed to mention the violence unleashed by the US-backed opposition, with right-wing mobs blocking key roads, including the one near Simón Bolívar International Airport, attacking buses, police vehicles, and security personnel, assassinating 2 grassroots activists from the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, and setting fire to a hospital. This was hardly peaceful, either for voters, international observers, or the electoral commission. The Carter Center’s very serious omissions and misrepresentations in this regard undermine the credibility of both the Center’s previous statements on the July 28 election and the institution itself.
Furthermore, the Carter Center’s assertion that they could not “corroborate the results” of the election is a red flag because, until the statutory time to produce polling results has come to pass, nobody outside the CNE — and now the Venezuelan Supreme Court — has the results. We are struck by the statements’ lack of evidence to defend its claims. To our knowledge, there is no international law or domestic Venezuelan law requiring that election results be published on the morning after an election, let alone disaggregated by polling station. In fact, under Venezuelan law the election commission has 30 days to release the results. In the US, states often take weeks to officially certify final results. We are deeply concerned by the time pressure that the Carter Center is placing on Venezuela, which could have the unintended effect of destabilizing the nation and creating the conditions for further violence when tensions are already high.
The NLG delegation’s assessment of the Venezuelan electoral system stands in stark contrast to that of the Carter Center. As with past NLG delegations, our delegation was impressed by the safeguards in place to ensure electoral integrity and the veracity of the results, as well as the efficiency and participatory nature of the Venezuelan election system as compared to US electoral systems. None of the individuals our delegation met with (unescorted by members of the Venezuelan government), in places such as drug stores, supermarkets, the subway, restaurants, and elsewhere mentioned issues with registration or restricted freedom of expression.
The NLG International Committee (IC) supports legal work around the world “to the end that human rights and the rights of ecosystems shall be regarded as more sacred than property interests.” As lawyers, law students, and legal activists, we seek to change U.S. foreign policy that threatens, rather than engages, or is based on a model of domination rather than respect. The Guild provides assistance and solidarity to movements in the United States and abroad that work for social justice in this increasingly interconnected world.
The Venezuelan far-right former candidate for the presidential elections that were held on July 28, Edmundo González Urrutia, has declared himself the winner despite coming in second place. He has been recognized as the “president” of Venezuela by Washington and some of its vassal states as part of a plot reminiscent of the failed Guaidó project. In parallel, there is a broad campaign on mainstream media and social media to create an image of González as a “bird-loving old grandfather;” a career diplomat with a “democratic vocation” who is “fighting for democracy” against the “Maduro regime” in Venezuela. However, Salvadorans, especially ex-combatants of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) from the Salvadoran war era, remember him very differently.
During 1979-1985, Edmundo González served as the second-in-command of the Venezuelan Embassy in San Salvador, under ambassador Leopoldo Castillo. Both officials participated in the United States’ Plan Cóndor counterinsurgency project in El Salvador, the aim of the project being the destruction of the Salvadoran popular armed revolution.
According to former FMLN Commander Nidia Díaz, during the late 70s and early 80s, the conspiracies to capture, torture, disappear, and kill revolutionaries and their sympathizers were planned in the Venezuelan embassy in El Salvador and were directed by Leopoldo Castillo, whose closest collaborator was Edmundo González. “Castillo was namedMatacuras[murderer of priests]—that is how he is known,” Díazcommented. “He was an agent of death and he persecuted Christians in the country. I do not doubt that he was involved in some way with the assassination of Saint Óscar Romero. We know that he was also involved with the assassination of the Maryknoll nuns in November 1982 as well as with the murders of many other priests.”
She added that while she was a prisoner of war, two officials from the Venezuelan embassy interrogated her. One of them was Castillo.
According to US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documentsdeclassifiedin February 2009, Castillo was mentioned as jointly responsible for the intelligence services that coordinated, financed, and gave the order for the execution of Operation Centauro, which consisted of a series of violent actions committed by the Salvadoran army and the Plan Cóndor death squads that were trained, armed, and financed by the US government led by Ronald Reagan to eliminate the Christian communities that were looking for a peaceful and negotiated solution to the war through the application of the principles of Liberation Theology.
During the period that Castillo and González were in charge of the Venezuelan embassy in El Salvador, the Salvadoran armed forces and the death squads killed 13,194 civilians, among them St. Óscar Arnulfo Romero, archbishop of the Catholic Church of El Salvador; four nuns of the Maryknoll order; and priests Rafael Palacios, Alirio Macias, Francisco Cosme, Jesús Cáceres, and Manuel Reyes.
Even after 1985, when Castillo no longer served as a diplomat, he still worked as an advisor to the US intelligence structure in El Salvador, calledPentagonito. It was during this period that he collaborated in the murders six Jesuit priests and two female household workers, namely, Ignacio Ellacuría, who was also the then rector of the University of Central America in San Salvador, Segundo Montes, Ignacio Martín-Baró, Juan Ramón Moreno, Amando López, Joaquin López, and Elba and Celina Ramos, in November 1989.
Another FMLN ex-combatant and former president of the Salvadoran Congress, Sigfrido Reyes, called Edmundo González “an accomplice of barbaric crimes.” “Edmundo González has this dark past,” said Reyes. “He is directly responsible for and a perpetrator of war crimes and crimes against humanity… Edmundo González’s hands are stained with blood.”
As for the reasons behind such involvement, Salvadoran historian Marvin Aguilar pointed out that it was not just those two diplomats but the entire Venezuelan State that collaborated with the United States’ Plan Cóndor to eliminate revolutions across Latin America. “The United States had its interests… and Carlos Andrés Pérez [then president of Venezuela] wanted international prestige, I think,” he remarked.
The historian added the Salvadoran and Venezuelan ultra-right forces collaborate to this day, albeit in a different form. “Today in El Salvador, there is a group of Venezuelans associated with the anti-Chavista right who work for the government of President Bukele,” he said, referring to a team of Venezuelans allied with the coup-plotter Juan Guaidó who serve as “advisors” to the president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele. “It is a sort ofshadow government. Thus, in one way or another, that connection exists.”
In May of this year, Venezuelan National Assembly Deputy Diosdado Cabello referred in detail toEdmundo González’s dark pastin an episode of his TV programCon El Mazo Dando. The PSUV leader said at that time that he got the information from a letter sent to him by a former official of the Colombian Foreign Affairs Ministry, named María Catalina Restrepo Pinzón de Londoño. However, after the program was aired, Venezuelan extreme-right-aligned journalists and social media personalities launched a media campaign claiming that no such Colombian official existed and that González was never involved in the massacres committed in El Salvador during the war era. However, Salvadoran ex-combatants from that same era, as well as documents from US federal agencies, dismantle that propaganda.
It may be mentioned here that in the aforementioned CIA documents, Castillo and González are named together with Luis Posada Carriles, the infamous Cuban counter-revolutionary terrorist and CIA asset who was the mastermind of the Cubana Flight 455 bombing and numerous other acts of terrorism against the Cuban Revolution, the people of Cuba, and other countries of the Caribbean.
In 2008, acase was opened in a Spanish courtby the US-based Center for Justice and Accountability and the Spanish Pro-Human Rights Association to bring the Salvadoran assassins and their superiors to justice. The case contemplates the massacres committed in El Salvador as crimes against humanity, and as such, they have no statute of limitations. Therefore, although González and his superior Castillo, who currently resides in Miami, USA, deny their involvement, they may still be called someday to respond to justice.
On July 28, the 70th birthday of Hugo Chávez (1954-2013), Nicolás Maduro Moros won the Venezuelan presidential election, the fifth since the Bolivarian Constitution was ratified in 1999. In January 2025, Maduro will start his third six-year term as president. He took over the reins of the Bolivarian Revolution after the death of Chávez from pelvic cancer in 2013. Since the death of Chávez, Maduro has faced several challenges: to build his own legitimacy as president in the place of a charismatic man who came to define the Bolivarian Revolution; to tackle the collapse of oil prices in mid-2014, which negatively impacted Venezuela’s state revenues (over 90 percent of which was from oil exports); and to manage a response to the unilateral, illegal sanctions deepened on Venezuela by the United States as oil prices declined. These negative factors weighed heavily on the Maduro government, which has now been in office for a decade after being re-elected through the ballot box in 2018 and now in 2024.
From Maduro’s first election victory in 2013, the increasingly far-right opposition began to reject the electoral process and complain about irregularities in the system. Interviews I have held over the past decade with conservative politicians have made it clear that they recognize both the ideological grip ofChavismoover the working class of Venezuela and the organizational power not only of Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela but of the networks ofChavismothat run from the communes (1.4 million strong) to youth organizations. About half of Venezuela’s voting population is reliably wedded to the Bolivarian project, and no other political project in Venezuela has the kind of election machine built by the forces of the Bolivarian revolution. That makes winning an election for the anti-Chávez forces impossible. To that end, their only path is to malign Maduro’s government as corrupt and to complain that the elections are not fair. After Maduro’s victory—by a margin of 51.2 percent to 44.2 percent—this is precisely what the far-right opposition has been trying to do, egged on by the United States and a network of far-right and pro-U.S. governments in South America.
Europe Needs Venezuelan Oil
The United States has been trying to find a solution to a problem of its own making. Having placed severe sanctions against both Iran and Russia, the United States now cannot easily find a source of energy for its European partners. Liquified natural gas from the United States is expensive and not sufficient. What the U.S. would like is to have a reliable source of oil that is easy to process and in sufficient quantities. Venezuelan oil fits the requirements, but given the U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, this oil cannot be found in the European market. The United States has created a trap from which it finds few solutions.
In June 2022, the U.S. governmentallowedEni SpA (Italy) and Repsol SA (Spain) to transport Venezuelan oil to the European market to compensate for the loss of Russian oil deliveries. This allowance revealed Washington’s shift in strategy regarding Venezuela. No longer was it going to be possible to suffocate Venezuela by preventing exports of oil, since this oil was needed as a result of U.S. sanctions on Russia. Since June 2022, the United States has been trying to calibrate its need for this oil, its antipathy to the Bolivarian Revolution, and its relations with the far-right opposition in Venezuela.
The U.S. and the Venezuelan Far-Right
The emergence ofChavismo—the politics of mass action to build socialism in Venezuela—transformed the political scenario in the country. The old parties of the right (Acción Democrática and COPEI) collapsed after 40 years of alternating power. In the 2000 and 2006 elections, the opposition to Chávez was provided not by the right, but by dissenting center-left forces (La Causa R and Un Nuevo Tiempo). The Old Right faced a challenge from the New Right, which was decidedly pro-capitalist, anti-Chavista, and pro-U.S.; this group formed a political platform called La Salida or The Exit, which referred to their desired exit from the Bolivarian Revolution. The key figures here were Leopoldo López, Antonio Ledezma, and María Corina Machado, who led violent protests against the government in 2014 (López was arrested for incitement to violence and now lives in Spain; a U.S. government official in 2009 said he is “oftendescribedas arrogant, vindictive, and power-hungry”). Ledezma moved to Spain in 2017 and was—with Corina Machado—a signatory of the far-rightMadrid Charter, an anti-communist manifesto organized by the Spanish far-right party, Vox. Corina Machado’s political project is underpinned by the proposal to privatize Venezuela’s oil company.
Since the death of Chávez, Venezuela’s right wing has struggled with the absence of a unified program and with a mess of egotistical leaders. It fell to the United States to try and shape the opposition into a political project. The most comical attempt was the elevation in January 2019 of an obscure politician named Juan Guaidó to be the president. That maneuver failed and in December 2022, the far-right oppositionremovedGuaidó as its leader. The removal of Guaidó allowed for direct negotiations between the Venezuelan government and the far-right opposition, which had since 2019 hoped for U.S. military intervention to secure them in power in Caracas.
The U.S. pressured the increasingly intransigent far-right to hold talks with the Venezuelan government in order to allow the U.S. to reduce sanctions and let Venezuelan oil go into European markets. This pressureresultedin the Barbados Agreement of October 2023, in which the two sides agreed to a fair election in 2024 as the basis for the slow withdrawal of the sanctions. The elections of July 28 are the outcome of the Barbados process. Even though María Corina Machado was barred from running, she effectively ran against Maduro through her proxy candidate Edmundo González and lost in a hard-fought election.
Twenty-three minutes after the polls closed, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris—and now a presidential candidate in the November elections in the United States—put out atweetconceding that the far-right had lost. It was an early sign that the United States—despite making noises about election fraud—wanted to move past their allies in the far-right, find a way to normalize relations with the Venezuelan government and allow the oil to flow to Europe. This tendency of the U.S. government has frustrated the far-right, whichturnedto other far-right forces across Latin America for support, and which knows that its remaining political argument is about election fraud. If the U.S. government wants to get Venezuelan oil to Europe it will need to abandon the far-right and accommodate the Maduro government. Meanwhile, the far-right has taken to the streets through armed gangs who want to repeat theguarimba(barricade) disruptions of 2017.
Vijay Prashad’s most recent book (with Noam Chomsky) is The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and the Fragility of US Power (New Press, August 2022).
Activists vow to fight the Cerro Blanco mine, which threatens a water supply for millions in Guatemala and El Salvador.
MICHAEL FOX | TRUTHOUT
What Major Media Outlets Aren't Saying About Bob Menendez
Gold bars. Stacks of cash. A Mercedes-Benz convertible.
Bob Menendez, the Cuban-American senator who is facing bribery charges in federal court today, has become a caricature of corruption in U.S. politics.
But what major media outlets aren't reporting is Menendez’s historic ties to U.S.-based terrorists responsible for bombings and assassinations in New York City and New Jersey. Nor is there much news about Menendez's outsized role in imposing devastating sanctions on Cuba that have fueled unprecedented migration to the U.S. border.
In ourJUST RELEASEDdocumentary,Hardliner on the Hudson, award-winning Cuban journalist Liz Oliva Fernández takes a deep dive into these issues and more. Check it out now for freeon YouTube.
Here’s a social media toolkit forHardliner on the Hudsonfor you to easily share the film on your preferred social media platforms.
Also, don’t forgot toRSVPto a virtual premiere event on May 20 at 7pm ET for our groundbreaking documentaryUphill on the Hill, which explores why Biden has embraced Trump’s Cold War-era policy toward Cuba.
HEREis a social media toolkit forUphill on the Hill.
Please help us spread the word about these important documentaries!
The economic crisis and unrest in Santiago de Cuba underscores the devastating impact of over 6 decades of illegal U.S. sanctions, the no-evidence-based designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and theinflationary financial manipulationwhich have led to shortages of fuel, electricity, and basic goods.
Yesterday, people took to the streets in Santiago de Cuba expressing their frustration at the recent power outages. Miami regime-changers and U.S. government-funded propaganda outlets were quick to exploit these genuine frustrations into calls for the overthrow of the Cuban government, but this does not match therealityof the situation on the ground in Santiago, where the protests were completely peaceful and citizens engaged in dialogue withlocal leadersand law enforcement.
In the words of the State Department itself, the goal of the U.S. blockade is to bring about “hunger, desperation, and overthrow of government” in Cuba (see the Mallory memo). We are seeing this policy play out in real time, and as people in the U.S., we have every responsibility to fight against U.S. attacks on Cuba’s sovereignty. True solidarity with the Cuban people necessitates respecting their right to self-determination, and demanding an end to external U.S. interventions which deny Cuba this right and aim to return Cuba to being a U.S. neocolony like Haiti (which the U.S. and its comprador states are preparing to invade yet again).
We call for the US to take Cuba off the “State Sponsors of Terrorism” List and lift all sanctions - measures that would immediately help alleviate Cuba’s economic crisis.
TheNational Network on Cubais a coalition of 70+ organizations across the U.S. working to normalize U.S.-Cuba relations and lift the blockade.
More than 8,400 people were victims of gang violence in Haiti last year, including killings, injuries and kidnappings–a 122 per cent increase over 2022, the UN Special Representative for the country told the UN Security Council on Thursday.
“I cannot overstress the severity of the situationin Haiti, where multiple protracted crises have reached a critical point,” said Maria Isabel Salvador, presenting the latest report of the UN political office there,BINUH.
The Caribbean country remains plagued by mounting violence and insecurity at the hands of armed gangs against a backdrop of political, humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges.
Violence spreading
About 83 per cent of the unprecedented surge in killings and injuries occurred in the capital, Port-au-Prince, but violence has spread elsewhere, specifically Artibonite, the largest of Haiti's 10 departments
South of the capital, gangs conducted large-scale attacks to control key zones and continue to systematically use sexual violence in areas under their control, putting women and girls as young as 12 at risk.
Ms. Salvador said that since her last briefing in October, at least 75 people were reported killed by civilian vigilante movements that have emerged as collective defence against the gangs.
Support Haiti’s police
Meanwhile, BINUH has continued efforts to enhance the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP), but high attrition rates have further diminished the force’s ability to counter gang violence and maintain security.
The Haitian Government and the international community have stepped up support to the HNP over the past few months, she added.
This has included a 13 per cent increase allocated under the national budget for this fiscal year and the supply of individual protection equipment, armoured vehicles, motorcycles and weapons.
Last October, the UNSecurity Councilauthorizedthe deployment of a multinational security support mission (MSS) to back Haiti’s beleaguered police force, which Kenya offered to lead. A 2022 sanctions regime targeting gang leaders and their financiers was also renewed later that month.
Ms. Salvador said she will continue to encourage all stakeholders to effectively prepare for the mission's deployment and again appealed for countries to contribute generously towards this end.
Break the cycle
While improving the security situation is essential to break the cycle of overlapping crises besetting Haiti, she stressed that long-term stability can only be achieved through a nationally owned and inclusive political process.
Echoing the UN Secretary-General, she urged all political actors and stakeholders “in and for Haiti” to unite in prioritizing and upholding the interest of the people above all. She noted that “new violent actors have been gaining prominence” in recent months, sparking concerns over their potentially destabilizing role.
“The continuous support to the Haitian National Police, the rapid deployment of the MSS, effective sanctions and a sustained political process" which results in “credible, participatory and inclusive elections” are essential, she said.
These are “fundamental elements to restore security and stability in Haiti, where, consequently, the rule of law, democratic institutions and sustainable development become a reality for its people,” she added.
Arms trafficking ‘blind spot’
The head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Ghada Waly, alsoupdatedthe Council on arms trafficking and illicit financial flows in Haiti.
A UNODC report last October had identifiedfour major sea and land routes being used for illicit firearm and ammunition flows, mainly from the US.
The latest report, published on Wednesday, found that there are 11 recorded informal or clandestine airstrips spread out across Haiti.
“They represent a blind spot that is possibly being used by traffickers and smugglers, bearing in mind that smaller aircraft flying directly between the United States and Haiti are difficult to monitor,” Ms. Wady said.
A regional concern
Regional dynamics are also important as the deepening crisis in Haiti is not occurring in a vacuum, she added, noting that illicit firearms are a growing concern across the Caribbean, “feeding gang-related activity and drug trafficking in a vicious circle”.
The report also documents action to combat corruption and illicit financial flows, “which are major factors enabling violence and organized crime and plaguing Haiti’s own justice institutions”.
“Nevertheless, anti-corruption efforts continue to be impeded by insufficient capacity, lack of forensic equipment and limited expertise in conducting complex investigations,” she said.
The next UNODC report will focus on a detailed analysis of gang dynamics in Haiti.
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